Alfarabi on Society

Securing Satisfaction

Alfarabi was an Islamic philosopher, alive in the tenth century, who was deeply influenced by the ancient Greek philosophers, particularly Aristotle. He grappled with the question: How to secure satisfaction for all in society? In his The Attainment of Happiness, he suggests a few foundational, methodical practices that can be made in the body politic so that shared happiness arises. Happiness, he says, is the highest human ideal, echoing Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia as the telos (end) of human life achieved through rational activity and virtue. Alfarabi’s suggestions, though anachronistic to modernity in their ultimately hierarchical and inorganic approach, contain nuggets of relevance that provide a springboard for modern action.

Alfarabi believed in four practices required to create a social basis for general happiness. These include theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues, and the practical arts. The word ‘‘virtue’’ in this context means ‘‘excellence,” as in Aristotle’s functional definition: the virtue of a thing is that which enables it to perform its proper function well (e.g., the virtue of a flame is its light and heat).

The theoretical virtues pertain to what Alfarabi calls the “rational soul.” To cultivate these virtues means to perfect the intellect through knowledge and science, of both the material and metaphysical realms. True knowledge of God, for example, is considered to be a theoretical virtue. This aligns with Aristotle’s elevation of contemplative wisdom (sophia) as the highest intellectual virtue. The goal of these virtues, says Alfarabi, is for the rational soul to attain immortality through development in earthly life, such that it might subsist without the body upon death.

The deliberative virtues relate to man’s excellence in applying the aforementioned theoretical virtues to reality. Deliberative virtues spring from thinking into action. A leader of society, therefore, must have well-developed deliberative virtues and be capable of relating many interdisciplinary sciences to the practical workings of society. This requires attention to the means by which one can attain a good end, not merely knowledge of that good end.

Alfarabi’s moral virtues underscore the capacity for moral excellence in the human being. He emphasizes the development of virtues such as courage, generosity, and self-control. He says that most people are not born with these virtues, and that they take hard work and a great deal of inner striving to attain. A supreme ruler, however, must have a disposition that is more compatible with these moral virtues. He says that such virtues are primarily required for the ‘‘supreme ruler’’ to recognize which goals are actually good and worth pursuing. These virtues, once developed, can connect human beings to the “divine intellect.” This seems like a good nugget to hold on to.

The fourth thing required to create the social basis for general happiness is the practical arts. This refers to a wide array of arts, including political art, or art of leadership, as well as vocational creative arts such as music, writing, medicine, weaving, metalwork, and so on. Such skills, assures Alfarabi, are necessary for a society to thrive. Yes. Amidst a modernity that encourages less and less knowledge of the practical arts, this seems especially valuable.

If someone were to possess all four of these qualities—theoretical, deliberative, and moral virtues, as well as skill in the practical arts—they would then be considered to be ‘‘tahqīq al-dhāt,” a word that translates to “self-actualized,” though it came about far before Maslow popularized that term in the 20th century. This person would therefore have attained the right to be a supreme leader who can cultivate true happiness within the common citizen.

Alfarabi concludes by describing how these potentials for happiness are cultivated in a person either via instruction or the formation of character. “To instruct is to introduce the theoretical virtues in nations and cities. The formation of character is the method of introducing the moral virtues and the practical arts in nations. Instruction proceeds by speech alone” (565).

It should be noted that for Alfarabi, the happiness of those who are not capable of studying philosophy is dependent on the structure and workings of society that he has laid out here. The purpose of the government, therefore, is to arrange and manage the “non-philosophers” to promote their happiness as much as possible. Those who are most fit to govern, however, are those capable of studying and, more importantly, comprehending philosophy. Importantly, he notes that the ruler should be both philosopher, legislator, and imam (religious leader). This is crucial to the ideal effect that a ruler will have on society: reverence and submissiveness from the common folk. If a leader is “self-actualized” and also a philosopher, legislator, and imam, he will be capable of habituating, persuading, and coercing the members of society to live in such a way that happiness will necessarily spring forth. This is where his contribution obviously falls short when it comes to modern ideals of democracy and egalitarianism. Since his time, it has been proven that methods of habituation and coercion do not reap happy fruit.

Lastly, Alfarabi believed that religion is philosophy for the masses: it persuades rather than proves; philosophy, on the other hand, understands religion for what it really is through ‘‘metaphysical science.’’ We must ask, he says, not only whether something is, but also why it is. For this process, he describes certain principles that can be applied: namely, the principles of instruction and the principles of being. It is through the former that one comes to know the latter. He then suggests that, if one were to inquire into the principles of being of the ‘‘heavenly bodies’’ one would find that it is necessary to develop a science of the metaphysical, for there are undeniable principles that “are not bodies or in bodies, and that never were or will be bodies” (558).

Alfarabi invites the possibility that “metaphysical” or spiritual science is as vital in investigating the truth as is material science. This builds on Aristotle’s own Metaphysics, which investigates immaterial principles and causes beyond the physical world. That nugget seems to me most relevant. Perhaps if modernity took up a “science of the metaphysical,” as Alfarabi suggests, some of the virtues and practices he delineates somewhat pedantically could be taken up more organically and out of freedom. Either way, he has provided a stepping stone.

Works Cited

Foltz, Bruce, editor. Medieval Philosophy: A Multicultural Reader. Bloomsbury Academic, 2019